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As we saw in Chapter 25, agreements among competitors that restrain trade can violate Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Such anticompetitive agreements can involve trademarks, copyrights,
patents and other intellectual property rights. If they seek to fix prices, allocate markets or impose
similar restraints on competition, such agreements are per se illegal; otherwise they are evaluated
under the rule of reason, balancing their pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects.
In this chapter, we will consider an important category of agreements among competitors –
those in which intellectual property rights are combined or “pooled” for various purposes. The first
documented patent pool in the U.S. was formed in 1856 by three leading manufacturers of sewing
machines.1 Since then, IP pools have evolved and
grown in complexity. Though the specifics vary from
The crux of an IP pooling
arrangement is the aggregation of the
pool to pool, at the most general level, IP pools involve
pool members’ rights for more
the aggregation and centralized licensing of IP rights
convenient licensing …
held by different parties. In some cases, this centralized
licensing function is carried out by one of the pool
members, and in others it is performed by an independent pool administrator. Some pools grant
licenses only to pool members, while others make licenses available to members and non-members
alike. The crux of an IP pooling arrangement today is typically the aggregation of the pool
members’ rights for licensing to users in a single transaction, with the proceeds of that transaction
allocated among the pool members according to some predetermined formula. Such pooling
arrangements can have numerous pro-competitive effects, but without certain precautions, they
can also harm or reduce competition.

1

For an informative history of the Singer Combination, see Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First
American Patent Thick-et: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 165 (2011).
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Basic structure of a patent pool with per-patent allocation of royalties and no pool administration
charges

As we will discuss in the remainder of this Chapter, IP pools vary in a number of important
respects, but they often share a number of key features, including the following:
•

Rights are licensed (or assigned) by the members to a centralized pool administrator (one
of the members or an independent third party)

•

The administrator grants licenses of the pooled rights to third party licensees/users

•

The pooled rights are licensed as a bundle, not separately

•

Any interested party may obtain a license

•

Royalties are charged to all licensees on a consistent basis

•

Licenses are granted using relatively simple, standardized form agreements

•

Licenses are non-exclusive

•

Income received by the pool is allocated to the pool members according to a predetermined formula, usually after the deduction of administrative fees and charges

As you review the materials in this chapter, bear in mind that IP pools have impacted a broad
range of industries over the past century, from motion pictures and recorded music to aviation and
automobiles to semiconductors and telecommunications.2 Pools have enabled transactions
involving dozens, hundreds or thousands of individual IP rights that otherwise might have been
2

For an informative catalog of patent pools from the early twentieth century to today, see Michael Mattioli,
Power and Governance in Patent Pools, 27 Harv. J. L. Tech. 421, 446-47, 463-65 Appendix (2014).
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impossible to effect, but some have crossed the line into anticompetitive territory. The complexity
in structuring, forming and operating effective IP pools arises to a large degree from walking the
tightrope between pro-competitive and anticompetitive features.
A.

THEORIES OF IP POOLING: EFFICIENCY AND ENABLEMENT

There are two fundamental motivating forces behind IP pooling, which I refer to as efficiency
and enablement. Efficiency is relatively easy to grasp. If a firm holds twelve patents covering
different aspects of an electric motor, it is more efficient for a motor manufacturer to license all
twelve in a single transaction than to license them one by one. The manufacturer can thus pay a
single royalty for each motor that it sells, and does not have to determine which motors practice
which patents and account for each separately. As we saw in Chapter 24, parties to a licensing
transaction may find the convenience of licensing a bundle of patents to be mutually beneficial,
even if the royalty remains constant as some of the patents in the bundle expire (Automatic Radio
v. Hazeltine (U.S. 1950)). Such package licensing runs afoul of the antitrust laws only when it
becomes coercive (Zenith v. Hazeltine (U.S. 1969)).
So, if efficiencies can be gained by licensing a single holder’s patents in a bundle, then it stands
to reason that bundling patents held by multiple patent holders should create even greater
efficiencies. Thus, in the example above, instead of one firm holding twelve patents covering
electric motors, suppose that twelve different firms each held one such patent. Then in order to
make electric motors, a manufacturer would have to negotiate successfully with twelve different
parties – a substantially more costly and time-consuming proposition. But aggregating the twelve
firms’ patents into a single pool and licensing them together, as a single bundle, would enable the
manufacturer, again, to acquire the necessary rights in a single transaction: a substantial gain in
efficiency.
The efficiency justification for IP pools is even more pronounced with respect to copyrights.
As discussed in Chapter 16, every composer, lyricist and musician holds a copyright interest in the
songs that he or she creates, and the public broadcast and performance of music potentially
involves thousands of copyright licenses. The aggregation and pooling of these rights is thus
essential to distribution of music, film and other copyrighted works. Performing rights
organizations such as ASCAP, BMI and SEASAC, discussed in Chapter 16.B, have aggregated
and pooled copyrights in musical works for more than a century, thereby enabling the broad
dissemination of musical works through radio broadcast, live performance and online distribution
channels. As we saw in Chapter 25.E (Note 5), the Hollywood studios of the mid-20th century
sought to package their films into bundles that they licensed to movie theaters and television
stations for public viewing. By and large, these “block booking” arrangements, in which popular
films like “Casablanca” were bundled with B-movies like “Gorilla Man”, and in which the
distributor had no choice but to pay for them all, have been held to constitute illegal tying
arrangements. Even so, it is not hard to see the transactional efficiencies that studios, as well as
theaters and television networks, would enjoy by conducting business with large bundles of
content, rather than individual titles. When a few licensors each control a large number of
copyrighted works, pooling is a natural inclination.
But pooling is useful not only to reduce the number of individual licenses that must be
negotiated. It also serves the important, and related, function of enabling market activity by

3
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assembling complementary rights. In an influential 1998 paper,3 Michael Heller and Rebecca
Eisenberg identify a phenomenon known as an “anti-commons”, a situation in which the rights
necessary to accomplish a particular task (e.g., building a motor, developing a drug) are held by
dispersed parties that are difficult to assemble. This phenomenon is also known as a patent or IP
‘thicket’. Heller and Eisenberg observe that “a [scarce] resource is prone to underuse in a ‘tragedy
of the anticommons’ when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others … and no one has
an effective privilege of use.” In other words, if a set of IP rights is required to manufacture a
particular product, and a potential manufacturer is unable to acquire the necessary permissions
from each of the different rights holders, then it will not be legally permitted to produce the
product.
Heller and Eisenberg analogize the anti-commons that developed among retail operators in the
Soviet Union to patents covering biomedical innovations, theorizing that a large number of patents
held by different parties could stifle lifesaving innovations. One potential solution to the anticommons problem is pooling: “When the background legal rules threaten to waste resources,
people often rearrange rights sensibly and create order through private arrangements.” Pooling of
necessary or blocking IP rights, then, enables the production of goods that would otherwise be
absent from the market. Or, as economist Carl Shapiro has written, patent pooling is a “natural
and effective method[] used by market participants to cut through the patent thicket.”4
IP Pooling thus accomplishes two related but distinct functions, increasing transactional
efficiency by reducing the number of license negotiations in which any given licensee must
engaged, and clearing blocking IP positions to enable the broader creation of goods covered by IP.

3

Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998).

4

Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting in
Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds.,
2001).
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SOVIET STOREFRONTS AND THE ANTI-COMMONS
“Privatization in postsocialist economies starkly illustrates how anticommons property can emerge
and persist. One promise of the transition to a free market was that new entrepreneurs would fill
stores that socialist rule had left bare. Yet after several years of reform, many privatized storefronts
remained empty, while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of goods, mushroomed on the streets.
Why did the new merchants not come in from the cold? One reason was that transition
governments often failed to endow any individual with a bundle of rights that represents full
ownership. Instead, fragmented rights were distributed to various socialist-era stakeholders,
including private or quasi-private enterprises, workers’ collectives, privatization agencies, and
local, regional, and federal governments. No one could set up shop without first collecting rights
from each of the other owners.” Heller and Eisenberg (1998).

Busy street kiosks in front of empty stores (Tverskaya, 1991)

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Non-Exclusivity. Almost all IP pools license their pooled assets on a non-exclusive basis.
Why do you think this is? What would be the disadvantage of licensing pooled assets on an
exclusive basis?
2. Allocation Systems. When a pool grants a license, the licensee typically pays a royalty to
the pool for all of the rights contained in the pool. It is up to the pool administrator to allocate that
royalty among the individual pool members. The method by which royalties are allocated among
pool members is often a closely-guarded secret. In some cases, royalties may be simply be split
evenly among pool members, as they were in Standard Oil (Indiana) (see Part C, below, footnote
8) (a per capita system). In other cases, royalties may be allocated to members based on the
number of IP rights that each has contributed (e.g., if a member contributed 5 of 100 patents to the

5
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pool, then it would be entitled to 5% of the royalties received by the pool) (patent counting).5
Hybrids of per capita and per patent allocation systems also exist, as illustrated by the RFID patent
pool, in which “half of the royalties are al-located to participants based on the number of patents
contributed by each participant, and the other half are allocated substantially equally among
participants.”6 Finally, royalties may be allocated to a member based on the value of the IP that it
has contributed (value-based allocation). This system is sometimes used to allocate larger shares
of a pool’s revenue to early or ‘founder’ members of the pool.7 What advantages and
disadvantages do you see with respect to each of these allocation methodologies?
3. When Pools Compete. Most IP pooling arrangements are voluntary, meaning that rights
holders may elect to participate or not. In some cases, multiple pools cover the same product, so
that a would-be manufacturer must obtain a license from each pool in order to manufacture the
product. An example can be found in DVD technology:
In late 1995, it was reported that four “core” DVD developers of a ten-member
DVD consortium would enter into a patent pooling agreement to administer the
licensing of DVD patents. The core members, Philips, Sony, Matsushita and
Toshiba, reportedly extended an open invitation to secondary patent holders
claiming rights to DVD-related patents.
In August, 1996, after a period of failed negotiations among the core consortium
members, Sony and Philips announced that they would form their own DVD pool,
with Philips to be the licensor. Philips stated that “[t]here were so many differences
of opinion that we could not wait for these to be settled.” Pioneer Electronics
subsequently joined this three-firm pool. Six months later, Hitachi, Matsushita,
Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba and JVC formed their own patent pool. Industry
analysts warned that without a single, unitary pool, the price of DVD technology
would increase since a piecemeal licensing system would push the cost of the
technology higher.8
Notwithstanding the split among the principal DVD patent holders, the two DVD patent pools
(which became known as the DVD3C and DVD6C pools) operated side by side for years and
reduced the number of licenses required of by manufacturers of DVD players and discs from ten
to two. The DVD format became one of the most broadly adopted standards in the world. Yet
time has overtaken even DVD. The DVD6C pool announced that it would stop offering new patent
licenses on January 1, 2020.9

5

See Mattioli, supra note 2, at 446-47 (describing per-patent allocation system in MPEG-2 patent pool).

6

Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of the Dep’t of Justice, to William
F. Dolan and Geoffrey Oliver, Jones Day (Oct. 21, 2008).

7

See Mattioli, supra note 2, at 441-42 (describing percentage-based allocation system of the early 20th
century raisin patent pool).

8

Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools 32 (Aug.,
1999 Revision), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/pools.pdf (visited Sep. 12, 2020).

9

DVD6C Licensing Group, Information, http://www.dvd6cla.com/index.html (visited Sep. 12, 2020).
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The DVD6C Licensing Group was formed by Hitachi, Matsushita (Panasonic), Mitsubishi, Time Warner,
Toshiba and JVC, who were later joined by Samsung, Sanyo and Sharp

4. Pooling Holdouts. Given the voluntary nature of IP pools, it is also possible that some IP
holders will elect not to join any pool. Research by Anne Layne-Farrar and Josh Lerner10 suggests
that most patent pools today are incomplete. They found that major nine patent pools directed at
significant technology standards (e.g., DVD, 3G, Bluetooth) had coverage rates of between 10%
and 89% of the total patents believed to be necessary to practice the standards. Why might an IP
holder “hold out” and decline to join a pool?11 If pools enhance the overall efficiency of markets,
how might IP holders be encouraged to join pools rather than licensing and asserting their rights
independently?
5. Royalty Stacking and Cournot Complements. Commentators have also suggested that
pooling complementary IP can reduce the overall cost of obtaining licenses to that IP. The theory
of complementary production inputs originated with French mathematician Antoine Augustin
Cournot in 1838. Carl Shapiro explains Cournot’s insight and its application to modern technology
markets, as follows:
Cournot considered the problem faced by a manufacturer of brass who had to
purchase two key inputs, copper and zinc, each controlled by a monopolist. As
Cournot demonstrated, the resulting price of brass was higher than would arise if a
single firm controlled trade in both copper and zinc, and sold these inputs to a
competitive brass industry (or made the brass itself). Worse yet, the combined
profits of the producers were lower as well in the presence of complementary
monopolies. So, the sad result of the balkanized rights to copper and zinc was to
harm both consumers and producers. The same applies today when multiple
companies control blocking patents for a particular product, process, or business
method.
How can the inefficiency associated with multiple blocking patents be eliminated?
One natural and attractive solution is for the copper and zinc suppliers to join forces
10

Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent Pool Participation and Rent
Sharing Rules, 29 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 294, 299 (2011).

11

For thorough discussions of the business motivations for holding out in the context of patent pools, see
Layne-Farrar and Lerner, supra note 10, at 296-97; Michael Mattioli, Patent Pool Outsiders, 33 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 225, 239-46 (2018).
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and offer their inputs for a single, package price to the brass industry. The two
monopolist suppliers will find it in their joint interest to offer a package price that
is less than these two components sold for when priced separately. The blocking
patent version of this principle is that the rights holders will find it attractive to
create a package license or patent pool.
[I]f the two patent holders see benefits from enabling many others to make products
that utilize their intellectual property rights, a patent pool, under which all the
blocking patents are licensed in a coordinated fashion as a package, can be an ideal
outcome. [This] simple theory … suggests that coordinating such licensing can lead
to lower royalty rates than would independent pricing (licensing) of the two
companies' patents.12
Do you see why combining patents (or other IP rights) in a pool might lower the overall cost
of licensing these rights? How do you think this concept affects the likelihood that certain patent
holders will hold out and refuse to join a pool (see Note 4)?

Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877)
developed a theory of complementary
production inputs that is today known as the
theory of Cournot complements

6. The Mystery of the Missing Biotech Patent Pools. Despite cautionary predictions by
scholars like Heller and Eisenberg, few patent pools -- and none of commercial significance -have emerged in the biotechnology sector. Even in 1998, Heller and Eisenberg recognized that a
number of structural and institutional factors that might work against the formation of pools in the
biotech sector, including transaction costs associated with accumulating sufficient rights to
practice biotechnology inventions, the divergent interests of biotech patent holders, and cognitive
biases causing researchers to over-estimate the value of their own discoveries. Other factors may
also be at work, including “the need for at least some market exclusivity in an environment with
extremely high costs of product development, clinical trials and regulatory approval; patent
holders’ desire to retain control over their assets; and concerns over compromising commercial

12

Shapiro, supra note 4, at 123 (emphasis in original).
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secrecy by collaborating with others.”13 What do you make of the lack of patent pools in the
biotechnology sector, when pooling activity in areas such as electronics and telecommunications
has only increased?
7. New Forms of Fragmentation. Heller and Eisenberg identified the potential of patents to
fragment markets for innovation in biotechnology, yet that anticommons and the accompanying
stifling of innovation does not seem to have occurred for a variety of reasons. Nevertheless,
concerns have been raised regarding other trends toward fragmentation of rights that could cause
similar or even greater hurdles to innovation. Consider the following:
A spate of recent legal disputes in the U.S. ha[s] led to increasing calls for personal
ownership of genetic and other health information. [D]espite the good intentions
behind many of these proposals, granting individuals an enforceable property
interest in information about themselves … could pose significant impediments to
data-driven research, particularly in the coming era of mega-cohort studies
involving a million and more individuals.
Thus, while Heller and Eisenberg worried that fragmented interests held by a few
dozen or hundred patent owners could severely impede biomedical research, the
possibility that millions of individual data subjects could demand clearance,
oversight or payment in order to use their data … has far more dramatic
ramifications for biomedical research.14
Is the type of rights fragmentation identified in the above excerpt similar to the fragmentation
that could arise due to dispersed patent ownership? Could this type of data ownership
fragmentation effectively be addressed by pooling solutions?
B.

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PATENT POOLS

The earliest patent pools emerged prior to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.
But almost as soon as the Sherman Act became law, antitrust enforcers turned an eye toward the
pooling arrangements that large industrial concerns created using patents. In the following case,
the Supreme Court considered such an arrangement led by John D. Rockefeller’s infamous
Standard Oil Trust.
STANDARD OIL CO. (INDIANA) V. UNITED STATES.
283 U.S. 163 (1931)
BRANDEIS, JUSTICE
This suit was brought by the United States in June, 1924, in the federal court for northern
Illinois, to enjoin further violation of section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The
13

Jorge L. Contreras, The anticommons at twenty: concerns for research continue, 361 Science 335, 336
(2018).

14

Contreras, Anticommons, supra note 13, at 336-37.
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violation charged is an illegal combination to create a monopoly and to restrain interstate
commerce by controlling that part of the supply of gasoline which is produced by the process of
cracking. Control is alleged to be exerted by means of seventy-nine contracts concerning patents
relating to the cracking art. The parties to the several contracts are named as defendants. Four of
them own patents covering their respective cracking processes, and are called the primary
defendants. Three of these, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, the Texas Company, and the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, are themselves large producers of cracked gasoline. The
fourth, Gasoline Products Company, is merely a licensing concern. The remaining forty-six
defendants manufacture cracked gasoline under licenses from one or more of the primary
defendants. They are called secondary defendants.
The violation of the Sherman Act now complained of rests substantially on the making and
effect of three contracts entered into by the primary defendants. The history of these agreements
may be briefly stated. For about half a century before 1910, gasoline had been manufactured from
crude oil exclusively by distillation and condensation at atmospheric pressure. When the demand
for gasoline grew rapidly with the widespread use of the automobile, methods for increasing the
yield of gasoline from the available crude oil were sought. It had long been known that from a
given quantity of crude, additional oils of high volatility could be produced by 'cracking'; that is,
by applying heat and pressure to the residum after ordinary distillation. But a commercially
profitable cracking method and apparatus for manufacturing additional gasoline had not yet been
developed. The first such process was perfected by the Indiana Company in 1913; and for more
than seven years this was the only one practiced in America. During that period the Indiana
Company not only manufactured cracked gasoline on a large scale, but also had licensed fifteen
independent concerns to use its process and had collected, prior to January 1, 1921, royalties
aggregating $15,057,432.46.
Meanwhile, since the phenomenon of cracking was not controlled by any fundamental patent,
other concerns had been working independently to develop commercial processes of their own.
Most prominent among these were the three other primary defendants, the Texas Company, the
New Jersey Company, and the Gasoline Products Company. Each of these secured numerous
patents covering its particular cracking process. Beginning in 1920, conflict developed among the
four companies concerning the validity, scope, and ownership of issued patents. One infringement
suit was begun; cross-notices of infringement, antecedent to other suits, were given; and
interferences were declared on pending applications in the Patent Office. The primary defendants
assert that it was these difficulties which led to their executing the three principal agreements
which the United States attacks; and that their sole object was to avoid litigation and losses incident
to conflicting patents.
The three agreements differ from one another only slightly in scope and terms. Each primary
defendant was released thereby from liability for any past infringement of patents of the others.
Each acquired the right to use these patents thereafter in its own process. Each was empowered to
extend to independent concerns, licensed under its process, releases from past, and immunity from
future claims of infringement of patents controlled by the other primary defendants. And each was
to share in some fixed proportion the fees received under these multiple licenses. The royalties to
be charged were definitely fixed in the first contract; and minimum sums per barrel, to be divided
between the Texas and Indiana companies, were specified in the second and third.
[P]ooling arrangements may obviously result in restricting competition. The limited
monopolies granted to patent owners do not exempt them from the prohibitions of the Sherman
10
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Act and supplementary legislation. Hence the necessary effect of patent interchange agreements,
and the operations under them, must be carefully examined in order to determine whether
violations of the Act result.
The Government contends that the three agreements constitute a pooling by the primary
defendants of the royalties from their several patents; that thereby competition between them in
the commercial exercise of their respective rights to issue licenses is eliminated; that this tends to
maintain or increase the royalty charged secondary defendants and hence to increase the
manufacturing cost of cracked gasoline; that thus the primary defendants exclude from interstate
commerce gasoline which would, under lower competitive royalty rates, be produced; and that
interstate commerce is thereby unlawfully restrained. There is no provision in any of the
agreements which restricts the freedom of the primary defendants individually to issue licenses
under their own patents alone or under the patents of all the others; and no contract between any
of them, and no license agreement with a secondary defendant executed pursuant thereto, now
imposes any restriction upon the quantity of gasoline to be produced, or upon the price, terms, or
conditions of sale, or upon the territory in which sales may be made. The only restraint thus
charged is that necessarily arising out of the making and effect of the provisions for cross-licensing
and for division of royalties.
The Government concedes that it is not illegal for the primary defendants to cross-license each
other and the respective licensees; and that adequate consideration can legally be demanded for
such grants. But it contends that the insertion of certain additional provisions in these agreements
renders them illegal. It urges, first, that the mere inclusion of the provisions for the division of
royalties, constitutes an unlawful combination under the Sherman Act because it evidences an
intent to obtain a monopoly. This contention is unsound. Such provisions for the division of
royalties are not in themselves conclusive evidence of illegality. Where there are legitimately
conflicting claims or threatened interferences, a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation, is
not precluded by the Act. An interchange of patent rights and a division of royalties according to
the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims is frequently necessary if
technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation. If the available advantages are
upon on reasonable terms to all manufacturers desiring to participate, such interchange may
promote rather than restrain competition.15
The Government next contends that the agreements to maintain royalties violate the Sherman
[Act] because the fees charged are onerous. The argument is that the competitive advantage which
the three primary defendants enjoy of manufacturing cracked gasoline free of royalty, while
licensees must pay to them a heavy tribute in fees, enables these primary defendants to exclude
from interstate commerce cracked gasoline which would, under lower competitive royalty rates,
be produced by possible rivals. This argument ignores the privileges incident to ownership of
patents. Unless the industry is dominated, or interstate commerce directly restrained, the Sherman
15

[n.6] Such agreements, varying in purpose, scope, and validity, are not uncommon. Conflict of patents in
the automobile industry, and the early difficulties encountered with an alleged basic patent, led to an
agreement in 1915, by which the members of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce crosslicensed each other without royalty for the use of all patent improvements. Interchange of basic aviation
patents was made during the [first] world war, at the suggestion of the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics. Various patent exchanges existing in the radio industry are detailed in the Report of the Federal
Trade Commission on the Radio Industry (1923).
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Act does not require cross-licensing patentees to license at reasonable rates others engaged in
interstate commerce. The allegation that the royalties charged are onerous is, standing alone,
without legal significance; and, as will be shown, neither the alleged domination, nor restraint of
commerce, has been proved.
The main contention of the Government is that even if the exchange of patent rights and
division of royalties are not necessarily improper and the royalties are not oppressive, the three
contracts are still obnoxious to the Sherman Act because specific clauses enable the primary
defendants to maintain existing royalties and thereby to restrain interstate commerce. The
provisions which constitute the basis for this charge are these. The first contract specifies that the
Texas Company shall get from the Indiana Company one-fourth of all royalties thereafter collected
under the latter's existing license agreements; and that all royalties received under licenses
thereafter issued by either company shall be equally divided. Licenses granting rights under the
patents of both are to be issued at a fixed royalty -- approximately that charged by the Indiana
Company when its process was alone in the field. By the second contract, the Texas Company is
entitled to receive one-half of the royalties thereafter collected by the Gasoline Products Company
from its existing licensees, and a minimum sum per barrel for all oil cracked by its future licensees.
The third contract gives to the Indiana Company one-half of all royalties thereafter paid by existing
licensees of the New Jersey Company, and a similar minimum sum for each barrel treated by its
future licensees, subject in the latter case to reduction if the royalties charged by the Indiana and
Texas companies for their processes should be reduced.16 The alleged effect of these provisions is
to enable the primary defendants, because of their monopoly of patented cracking processes, to
maintain royalty rates at the level established originally for the Indiana process.
The rate of royalties may, of course be a decisive factor in the cost of production. If combining
patent owners effectively dominate an industry, the power to fix and maintain royalties is
tantamount to the power to fix prices. Where domination exists, a pooling of competing process
patents, or an exchange of licenses for the purpose of curtailing the manufacture and supply of an
unpatented product, is beyond the privileges conferred by the patents and constitutes a violation
of the Sherman Act. The lawful individual monopolies granted by the patent statutes cannot be
unitedly exercised to restrain competition. But an agreement for cross-licensing and division of
royalties violates the Act only when used to effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to impose
otherwise an unreasonable restraint upon interstate commerce. In the case at bar, the primary
defendants own competing patented processes for manufacturing an unpatented product which is
sold in interstate commerce; and agreements concerning such processes are likely to engender the
evils to which the Sherman Act was directed. We must, therefore, examine the evidence to
ascertain the operation and effect of the challenged contracts.
“an agreement for cross-licensing and division of
royalties violates the [Sherman] Act only when
used to effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to
impose otherwise an unreasonable restraint upon
interstate commerce”
16

[n.8] Payments received by the Texas and Indiana companies under the second and third contracts are
divided equally by these companies pursuant to the terms of the first. That contract further provides that all
royalties received after January 1, 1937, even from existing licensees, are to be divided equally between
the two companies.
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No monopoly, or restriction of competition, in the business of licensing patented cracking
processes resulted from the execution of these agreements. Up to 1920 all cracking plants in the
United States were either owned by the Indiana Company alone, or were operated under licenses
from it. In 1924 and 1925, after the cross-licensing arrangements were in effect, the four primary
defendants owned or licensed, in the aggregate, only 55 percent of the total cracking capacity, and
the remainder was distributed among twenty-one independently owned cracking processes. This
development and commercial expansion of competing processes is clear evidence that the
contracts did not concentrate in the hands of the four primary defendants the licensing of patented
processes for the production of cracked gasoline. Moreover, the record does not show that after
the execution of the agreements there was a decrease of competition among them in licensing other
refiners to use their respective processes.
No monopoly, or restriction of competition, in the production of either ordinary or cracked
gasoline has been proved. The output of cracked gasoline in the years in question was about 26
percent of the total gasoline production. Ordinary or straight run gasoline is indistinguishable from
cracked gasoline and the two are either mixed or sold interchangeably. Under these circumstances
the primary defendants could not effectively control the supply or fix the price of cracked gasoline
by virtue of their alleged monopoly of the cracking processes, unless they could control, through
some means, the remainder of the total gasoline production from all sources. Proof of such control
is lacking. Evidence of the total gasoline production by all methods, of each of the primary
defendants and their licensees is either missing or unsatisfactory in character. The record does not
accurately show even the total amount of cracked gasoline produced, or the production of each of
the licensees, or competing refiners.
No monopoly, or restriction of competition, in the sale of gasoline has been proved. On the
basis of testimony relating to the marketing of both cracked and ordinary gasoline, the master
found that the defendants were in active competition among themselves and with other refiners;
that both kinds of gasoline were refined and sold in large quantities by other companies; and that
the primary defendants and their licensees neither individually or collectively controlled the
market price or supply of any gasoline moving in interstate commerce. There is ample evidence to
support these findings.
Thus it appears that no monopoly of any kind, or restraint of interstate commerce, has been
effected either by means of the contracts or in some other way. In the absence of proof that the
primary defendants had such control of the entire industry as would make effective the alleged
domination of a part, it is difficult to see how they could by agreeing upon royalty rates control
either the price or the supply of gasoline, or otherwise restrain competition. By virtue of their
patents they had individually the right to determine who should use their respective processes or
inventions and what the royalties for such use should be. To warrant an injunction which would
invalidate the contracts here in question, and require either new arrangements or settlement of the
conflicting claims by litigation, there must be a definite factual showing of illegality.
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In this iconic 1904 illustration from Puck, the Standard Oil Company is depicted as a malignant octopus
wrapping its tentacles around state and federal legislatures, the White House and representatives of the
steel, copper and shipping industries.

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Elimination of Blocking Positions. One the major procompetitive benefits that the Supreme
Court finds in the oil cracking pool is the elimination of blocking positions imposed by
competitors’ patents. That is, the four members of the cracking pool each held patents that could
block the others from practicing the technology to its fullest potential, thus depriving the market
of the most beneficial gasoline products. As the Court notes, “An interchange of patent rights and
a division of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent
claims is frequently necessary if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened
litigation.” Then, in footnote 8, the Court notes several other instances in which patent pools have
facilitated the progress of technical advancement in industries such as automobiles, aviation and
radio. How does a patent pool enable competitors to avoid each other’s “blocking” patents?17
2. Onerous Royalties and Exclusion. The government’s principal objection to the cracking
pool revolved around the parties’ royalty arrangements, which it claimed to be onerous. Who was
allegedly harmed by these royalty arrangements, and what effect did the government claim that
they had on the market? How did the court respond to these allegations? Under what circumstances
does the Court suggest that members of a patent pool might be required to limit the royalties that
they charge?
3. Price Fixing by Pooling. Even if the pooling parties had no obligation to limit the royalties
that they charged to others, the government still maintained that the parties’ royalty arrangement
was anticompetitive because it allowed them to maintain royalty rates at their original levels

17

See Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 Stan. Tech. L.
Rev. 3, § II.C (discussing Standard Oil (Indiana)).
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without the reductions that might result from competition. How did the court respond to this
argument?
4. The Courts Crack Down on Pools. Despite the favorable view of patent pools offered by
the Supreme Court in Standard Oil (Indiana), judicial attitudes toward patent pools soured soon
thereafter, following a general trend toward stricter application of the antitrust laws from the 1940s
through 1970s.18 In cases from Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) through
United States v. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, 1975 WL 405109 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1975), arrangements
among competitors involving patent pools were found to reduce competition and were ordered
dissolved.19 Nevertheless, patent pools increased in popularity again beginning in the 1980s, as
antitrust law again adopted a more lenient approach to intellectual property arrangements.

The U.S. Navy pressured feuding aircraft manufacturers Curtiss and Wright to form an early aviation
patent pool prior to U.S. entry into World War I. The Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA) pool
continued until it was disbanded by the Department of Justice in the 1970s.

18

This trend is also discussed in Chapter 25.A.

19

See Gilbert, supra note 17, at § II.D, and Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing
Current Debates In Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 Antitrust L.J. 39, 51-72.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
2017
5.5 Cross-Licensing and Pooling Arrangements20
[Pooling] arrangements may provide procompetitive benefits by integrating complementary
technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly
infringement litigation. By promoting the dissemination of technology … pooling arrangements
are often procompetitive.
[P]ooling arrangements can have anticompetitive effects in certain circumstances. For
example, collective price or output restraints in pooling arrangements, such as the joint marketing
of pooled intellectual property rights with collective price setting or coordinated output
restrictions, may be deemed unlawful if they do not contribute to an efficiency-enhancing
integration of economic activity among the participants. When … pooling arrangements are
mechanisms to accomplish naked price-fixing or market division, they are subject to challenge
under the per se rule.
Pooling arrangements generally need not be open to all who would like to join. However,
exclusion from … pooling arrangements among parties that collectively possess market power
may, under some circumstances, harm competition. In general, exclusion from a pooling …
arrangement among competing technologies is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects unless (1)
excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the good incorporating the
licensed technologies and (2) the pool participants collectively possess market power in the
relevant market. If these circumstances exist, the Agencies will evaluate whether the
arrangement’s limitations on participation are reasonably related to the efficient development and
exploitation of the pooled technologies and will assess the net effect of those limitations in the
relevant market.
Another possible anticompetitive effect of pooling arrangements may occur if the arrangement
deters or discourages participants from engaging in research and development, thus retarding
innovation. For example, a pooling arrangement that requires members to grant licenses to each
other for current and future technology at minimal cost may reduce the incentives of its members
to engage in research and development because members of the pool have to share their successful
research and development and each of the members can free ride on the accomplishments of other
pool members. However, such an arrangement can have procompetitive benefits, for example, by
exploiting economies of scale and integrating complementary capabilities of the pool members,
(including the clearing of blocking positions), and is likely to cause competitive problems only
when the arrangement includes a large fraction of the potential research and development in a
research and development market.
20

In this section, the agencies also discuss cross-licensing arrangements, which are omitted from this
excerpt for the sake of clarity. The 2017 Guidelines update an earlier set of Guidelines issued in 1995 with
few amendments.
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Members-Only Pools. The DOJ and FTC are careful to say that “[p]ooling arrangements
generally need not be open to all who would like to join”. That is, closed or members-only pools
are permitted. But this concept has significant caveats. When might it be anticompetitive for a
pool to exclude those who would like to join?
2. Innovation Effects. The agencies are particularly concerned with pools that discourage
future R&D and innovation. How might pooling IP rights discourage the members from pursuing
R&D activities? How might pooling IP increase R&D activity among the members? How should
an agency draw the line between pooling activity that promotes and harms innovation?
C.

PATENT POOLS FOR STANDARDS

As discussed in Chapter 20, many industry standards are developed through the collaboration
of different parties, whether through a commercial agreement, a joint venture or a standards
development organization (SDO). Parties that contribute technology to a standardization effort
sometimes obtain patents covering those technical contributions. In addition to licensing
requirements imposed by SDOs and private licensing arrangements among standards developers,
some standards have become the subject of patent pools.
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MPEG ALPHABET SOUP

The International Organization for Standards (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), both based in Geneva, Switzerland, develop standards for a wide range of
applications. In 1987, ISO’s Technical Committee 97 (Information Technology) merged with
IEC’s Technical Committee 83 to form Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1). The purpose of the
merger was to avoid duplication and incompatibility by consolidating the IT-related
standardization activities of ISO and IEC. JTC1 standardization projects include technologies as
diverse as office equipment, biometrics, artificial intelligence, smart cities and 3D printing, to
name just a few.
When JTC1 was formed it created several subcommittees, one of which (SC2) focused on
“Character Sets and Information Coding.” In January, 1988, Leonardo Chiariglione of Telecom
Italia and Hiroshi Yasuda of University of Tokyo formed a working group within JTC1 SC2 to
work on standards for compressing digital audiovisual signals. This group was formally known
as SC2 Working Group 8 (“Coded Representation of Picture and Audio Information”), but is better
known as the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG). When JTC1 reorganized its subcommittees
in 1991, MPEG became Working Group 11 of Subcommittee 29, with the formal designation
ISO/IEC JTC1 SC29/WG11.
Over the years, MPEG has developed some of the most pervasive audiovisual compression
standards on the planet including:
MPEG-1 (1993) – the first video compression standard for video CDs and cable/broadcast tv
MPEG-1 Audio Layer III (1993) – the ubiquitous .mp3 audio encoding format
MPEG-2 (1995) – audiovisual compression for digital tv, satellite, cable, and DVD
In 2001, MPEG joined forces with the Geneva-based International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) Telecommunications Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Video Coding Experts Group
(VCEG), formally designated as Study Group 16/Question 6 (SG16/Q6) to form a new group
known as the Joint Video Team (JVT). The JVT was responsible for developing the MPEG-4 Part
10 standard known as AVC (Advanced Video Coding), which was first released in 2003. Because
of the involvement of ITU-T, this standard is more commonly known by its ITU-T
recommendation number H.264. AVC is widely used by Blu-Ray discs as well as digital streaming
services such as Netflix, Hulu and YouTube.
In 2010, MPEG and VCEG formed the Joint Collaborative Team on Video Coding (JCT-VC) to
develop the High Efficiency Video Coding standard (HEVC or H.265), which achieved significant
efficiency gains over AVC/H.264.
Most recently, in 2017, MPEG and VCEG formed the Joint Video Exploration Team (JVET) to
develop an even more efficient compression standard known as Versatile Video Coding (VVC or
H.266), the first version of which was released in 2020.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION
MPEG-2 BUSINESS REVIEW LETTER
June 26, 1997
Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq.
Sullivan & Cromwell
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004-2498
Dear Mr. Beeney:
This is in response to your request on behalf of the Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu
Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V., Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp.
(collectively the "Licensors"), Cable Television Laboratories, Inc. ("CableLabs"), MPEG LA,
L.L.C. ("MPEG LA"), and their affiliates for the issuance of a business review letter pursuant to
the Department of Justice's Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6. You have requested a
statement of the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement intentions with respect to a proposed
arrangement pursuant to which MPEG LA will offer a package license under the Licensors' patents
that are essential to compliance with the MPEG-2 compression technology standard, and distribute
royalty income among the Licensors.
I. The Proposed Arrangement
A. The MPEG-2 Standard
The MPEG-2 standard has been approved as an international standard by the [Moving] Picture
Experts Group of the International Organization for Standards (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and by the International Telecommunication Union
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T).
The video and systems parts of the MPEG-2 standard will be applied in many different
products and services in which video information is stored and/or transmitted, including cable,
satellite and broadcast television, digital video disks, and telecommunications. However,
compliance with the standards will infringe on numerous patents owned by many different entities.
Consequently, a number of firms that participated in the development of the standard formed the
MPEG-2 Intellectual Property Working Group ("IP Working Group") to address intellectual
property issues raised by the proposed standard. Among other things, the IP Working Group
sponsored a search for the patents that covered the technology essential to compliance with the
proposed standard and explored the creation of a mechanism to convey those essential intellectual
property rights to MPEG-2 users. That exploration led ultimately to an agreement among the
Licensors, CableLabs and Baryn S. Futa establishing MPEG LA as a Delaware Limited Liability
Company.
Each of the Licensors owns at least one patent that the IP Working Group's patent search
identified as essential to compliance with the video and/or systems parts of the MPEG-2 standard
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(hereinafter "MPEG-2 Essential Patent" or "Essential Patent"). Among them, they account for a
total of 27 Essential Patents, which are most, but not all, of the Essential Patents. Pursuant to a
series of four proposed agreements, the Licensors will combine their Essential Patents into a single
portfolio (the "Portfolio") in the hands of a common licensing administrator that would grant
licenses under the Portfolio on a nondiscriminatory basis, collect royalties, and distribute them
among the Licensors pursuant to a pro-rata allocation based on each Licensor's proportionate share
of the total number of Portfolio patents in the countries in which a particular royalty-bearing
product is made and sold.
This arrangement is embodied in a network of four proposed agreements: (1) an Agreement
Among Licensors, in which the Licensors commit to license their MPEG-2 Essential Patents
jointly through a common License Administrator and agree on basic items including the Portfolio
license's authorized fields of use, the amount and allocation of royalties, and procedures for adding
patents to, and deleting them from, the Portfolio; (2) a Licensing Administrator Agreement
between the Licensors and MPEG LA, pursuant to which MPEG LA assumes the tasks of licensing
the Portfolio to MPEG-2 users and collecting and distributing royalty income; (3) a license from
each Licensor to MPEG LA for the purpose of granting the Portfolio License; and (4) the Portfolio
license itself.
B. MPEG LA
Pursuant to the Licensing Administrator Agreement, MPEG LA will: (1) grant a worldwide,
nonexclusive sublicense under the Portfolio to make, use and sell MPEG-2 products "to each and
every potential Licensee who requests an MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License and shall not
discriminate among potential licensees"; (2) solicit Portfolio licensees; (3) enforce and terminate
Portfolio license agreements; and (4) collect and distribute royalties. For this purpose, each MPEG2 Licensor will grant MPEG LA a nonexclusive license under its Essential Patents, while retaining
the right to license them independently for any purpose, including for making MPEG-2-compliant
products.
The Licensing Administrator Agreement places the day-to-day conduct of MPEG LA's
business, including its licensing activities, under the sole control of Futa and his staff. The other
owners retain some control, however, over "major decisions," including approval of budgets and
annual financial statements, extraordinary expenditures, entry into new businesses, mergers and
acquisitions, and the sale or dissolution of the corporation.
C. The MPEG-2 Portfolio
As noted above, the Portfolio initially will consist of 27 patents, which constitute most, but not
all, Essential Patents. These 27 patents were identified in a search carried out by an independent
patent expert under the sponsorship of the IP Working Group. Once the MPEG-2 standard was
largely in place, the IP Working Group issued a public call for the submission of patents that might
be infringed by compliance with the MPEG-2 standard. CableLabs, whose COO Futa was an active
participant in the IP Working Group, retained an independent patent expert familiar with the
standard and the relevant technology to review the submissions. In all, the expert and his assistant
reviewed approximately 8,000 United States patent abstracts and studied about 800 patents
belonging to over 100 different patentees or assignees. No submission was refused, and no entity
20
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3716569

Contreras

IP Licensing and Transactions

Chapter 27

or person that was identified as having an essential patent was in any way excluded from the effort
in forming the proposed joint licensing program.
The proposed agreement among the Licensors creates a continuing role for an independent
expert as an arbiter of essentiality. It requires the retention of an independent expert to review
patents submitted to any of the Licensors for inclusion in the Portfolio and to review any Portfolio
patent which an MPEG-2 Licensor has concluded is not essential or as to which anyone has
claimed a good-faith belief of non-essentiality. In both cases, the Licensors are bound by the
expert's opinion.
The Portfolio's composition may also change for other reasons. A patent will be deleted
promptly from the Portfolio upon a final adjudication of invalidity or unenforceability by a tribunal
of competent jurisdiction in the country of its issuance. The expiration of a Licensor's last-to-expire
Portfolio patent, or a final adjudication of invalidity or unenforceability of its last remaining
Portfolio patent, terminates the Licensor's participation in the Portfolio and the Agreement Among
Licensors. Each MPEG-2 Licensor may terminate its participation in the Portfolio license on 30
days' notice; however, all existing Portfolio licenses will remain intact.
D. The Portfolio License
The planned license from MPEG LA to users of the MPEG-2 standards is a worldwide,
nonexclusive, nonsublicensable license under the Portfolio patents for the manufacture, sale, and
in most cases, use of: (1) products and software designed to encode and/or decode video
information in accordance with the MPEG-2 standard; (2) products and software designed to
generate MPEG-2 program and transport bitstreams; and (3) so-called "intermediate products,"
such as integrated circuit chips, used in the aforementioned products and software.
The Portfolio license expires January 1, 2000, but is renewable at the licensee's option for a
period of not less than five years, subject to "reasonable amendment of its terms and conditions."
That "reasonable amendment" may not, however, increase royalties by more than 25%. Each
Portfolio licensee may terminate its license on 30 days' written notice. The per-unit royalties are
those agreed upon in the Agreement Among Licensors, but they are subject to reduction pursuant
to a "most-favored-nation" clause. The royalty obligations are predicated on actual use of one or
more of the licensed patents in the unit for which the royalty is assessed. The Portfolio license
imposes no obligation on the licensee to use only the licensed patents and explicitly leaves the
licensee free independently to develop "competitive video products or video services which do not
comply with the MPEG-2 Standard."
The Portfolio license will list the Portfolio patents in an attachment. It also explicitly addresses
the licensee's ability, and possible need, to obtain Essential Patent rights elsewhere. The Portfolio
license states that each Portfolio patent is also available for licensing independently from the
MPEG-2 Licensor that had licensed it to MPEG LA and that the license may not convey rights to
all Essential Patents.
The license's grantback provision requires the licensee to grant any of the Licensors and other
Portfolio licensees a nonexclusive worldwide license or sublicense, on fair and reasonable terms
and conditions, on any Essential Patent that it has the right to license or sublicense. The Licensors'
per-patent share of royalties is the basis for determining a fair and reasonable royalty for the
grantback. Alternatively, a licensee that controls an Essential Patent may choose to become an
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MPEG-2 licensor and add its patent to the Portfolio. Failure to honor the grantback requirement
constitutes a material breach of the license, giving MPEG LA the right to terminate the license
unless the licensee has cured the breach within 60 days after MPEG LA sends it notice of the
breach.
A separate provision allows for partial termination of a licensee's Portfolio license as to a
particular MPEG-2 Licensor's patents. Pursuant to Section 6.3, an MPEG-2 Licensor may direct
MPEG LA to withdraw its patents from the Portfolio license if the licensee has (a) brought a
lawsuit or other proceeding against the MPEG-2 Licensor for infringement of an Essential Patent
or an MPEG-2 Related Patent ("Related Patent") and (b) refused to grant the MPEG-2 Licensor a
license under the Essential Patent or MPEG-2 Related Patent on fair and reasonable terms and
conditions. As with the grantback, the per-patent share of Portfolio license royalties is the basis
for determining a fair and reasonable royalty for the licensee's patent. Upon the withdrawal of the
MPEG-2 Licensor's patents from the licensee's Portfolio license, the licensee may seek a license
on the withdrawn patents directly from the MPEG-2 Licensor, which remains subject to its
undertaking to the ISO and/or the ITU-T to license on fair and reasonable terms and conditions.

Patents covering many important standards today are licensed through patent pools

II. Analysis
A. The Patent Pool in General
An aggregation of patent rights for the purpose of joint package licensing, commonly called a
patent pool, may provide competitive benefits by integrating complementary technologies,
reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.
By promoting the dissemination of technology, patent pools can be procompetitive. Nevertheless,
some patent pools can restrict competition, whether among intellectual property rights within the
pool or downstream products incorporating the pooled patents or in innovation among parties to
the pool.
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A starting point for an antitrust analysis of any patent pool is an inquiry into the validity of the
patents and their relationship to each other. A licensing scheme premised on invalid or expired
intellectual property rights will not withstand antitrust scrutiny. And a patent pool that aggregates
competitive technologies and sets a single price for them would raise serious competitive concerns.
On the other hand, a combination of complementary intellectual property rights, especially ones
that block the application for which they are jointly licensed, can be an efficient and procompetitive
method of disseminating those rights to would-be users.
Based on your representations to us about the complementary nature of the patents to be
included in the Portfolio, it appears that the Portfolio is a procompetitive aggregation of intellectual
property. The Portfolio combines patents that an independent expert has determined to be essential
to compliance with the MPEG-2 standard; there is no technical alternative to any of the Portfolio
patents within the standard. Moreover, each Portfolio patent is useful for MPEG-2 products only
in conjunction with the others. The limitation of the Portfolio to technically essential patents, as
opposed to merely advantageous ones, helps ensure that the Portfolio patents are not competitive
with each other and that the Portfolio license does not, by bundling in non-essential patents,
foreclose the competitive implementation options that the MPEG-2 standard has expressly left
open.
The continuing role of an independent expert to assess essentiality is an especially effective
guarantor that the Portfolio patents are complements, not substitutes. The relevant provisions of
the Agreement Among Licensors appear well designed to ensure that the expert will be called in
whenever a legitimate question is raised about whether or not a particular patent belongs in the
Portfolio; in particular, they seem designed to reduce the likelihood that the Licensors might act
concertedly to keep invalid or non-essential patents in the Portfolio or to exclude other essential
patents from admission to the Portfolio.
B. Specific Terms of the Agreements
Despite the potential procompetitive effects of the Portfolio license, we would be concerned if
any specific terms of any of the contemplated agreements seemed likely to restrain competition.
Such possible concerns might include the likelihood that the Licensors could use the Portfolio
license as a vehicle to disadvantage competitors in downstream product markets; to collude on
prices outside the scope of the Portfolio license, such as downstream MPEG-2 products; or to
impair technology or innovation competition, either within the MPEG-2 standard or from rival
compression technologies. It appears, however, that the proposed arrangement will not raise any
significant competitive concerns.
1. Effect on Rivals
There does not appear to be any potential for use of the Portfolio license to disadvantage
particular licensees. The Agreement Among Licensors commits the Licensors to
nondiscriminatory Portfolio licensing, and the Licensing Administrator agreement both vests sole
licensing authority in MPEG LA and explicitly requires MPEG LA to offer the Portfolio license
on the same terms and conditions to all would-be licensees. Thus, maverick competitors and
upstart industries will have access to the Portfolio on the same terms as all other licensees. The
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Portfolio license's "most-favored-nation" clause ensures further against any attempt to discriminate
on royalty rates.
Although it offers the Portfolio patents only as a package, the Portfolio license does not appear
to be an illegal tying agreement. The conditioning of a license for one intellectual property right
on the license of a second such right could be a concern where its effect was to foreclose
competition from technological alternatives to the second. In this instance, however, the
essentiality of the patents -- determined by the independent expert -- means that there is no
technological alternative to any of them and that the Portfolio license will not require licensees to
accept or use any patent that is merely one way of implementing the MPEG-2 standard, to the
detriment of competition. Moreover, although a licensee cannot obtain fewer than all the Portfolio
patents from MPEG LA, the Portfolio license informs potential licensees that licenses on all the
Portfolio patents are available individually from their owners or assignees. While the independent
expert mechanism should ensure that the Portfolio will never contain any unnecessary patents, the
independent availability of each Portfolio patent is a valuable failsafe. The list of Portfolio patents
attached to the Portfolio license will provide licensees with information they need to assess the
merits of the Portfolio license.
2. Facilitation of Collusion
From what you have told us, there does not appear to be anything in the proposed agreements
that is likely to facilitate collusion among Licensors or licensees in any market. Although MPEG
LA is authorized to audit licensees, confidentiality provisions prohibit it from transmitting
competitively sensitive information among the Licensors or other licensees. Further, since the
contemplated royalty rates are likely to constitute a tiny fraction of MPEG-2 products’ prices, at
least in the near term, it appears highly unlikely that the royalty rate could be used during that
period as a device to coordinate the prices of downstream products.
3. Effect on Innovation
It further appears that nothing in the arrangement imposes any anticompetitive restraint, either
explicitly or implicitly, on the development of rival products and technologies. Nothing in the
Agreement Among Licensors discourages, either through outright prohibition or economic
incentives, any Licensor from developing or supporting a rival standard. As noted above, the
Portfolio license explicitly leaves licensees free independently to make products that do not
comply with the MPEG-2 standard and premises royalty obligations on actual use of at least one
Portfolio patent. Since the Portfolio includes only Essential Patents, the licensee's manufacture,
use or sale of MPEG-2 products will necessarily infringe the Portfolio patents. By weeding out
non-essential patents from the Portfolio, the independent-expert mechanism helps ensure that the
licensees will not have to pay royalties for making MPEG-2 products that do not employ the
licensed patents.
The license's initial duration, to January 1, 2000, does not present any competitive concern.
While the open-ended renewal term of "no less than five years" holds open the possibility of a
perpetual license, its competitive impact will depend substantially on whether any of the
"reasonable amendments" made at that time increase the license's exclusionary impact. While the
term "reasonable" is the Portfolio license's only limitation on the Licensors’ ability to impose
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onerous non-royalty terms on licensees at renewal time, the 25% cap on royalty increases and the
"most-favored-nation" clause appear to constrain the Licensors' ability to use royalties to exploit
any locked-in installed base among its licensees.
Nor does the Portfolio license's grantback clause appear anticompetitive. Its scope, like that of
the license itself, is limited to Essential Patents. It does not extend to mere implementations of the
standard or even to improvements on the essential patents. Rather, the grantback simply obliges
licensees that control an Essential Patent to make it available to all, on a nonexclusive basis, at a
fair and reasonable royalty, just like the Portfolio patents. This will mean that any firm that wishes
to take advantage of the cost savings afforded by the Portfolio license cannot hold its own essential
patents back from other would-be manufacturers of MPEG-2 products. While easing, though not
altogether clearing up, the holdout problem, the grantback should not create any disincentive
among licensees to innovate. Since the grantback extends only to MPEG-2 Essential Patents, it is
unlikely that there is any significant innovation left to be done that the grantback could discourage.
The grantback provision is likely simply to bring other Essential Patents into the Portfolio, thereby
limiting holdouts' ability to exact a supracompetitive toll from Portfolio licensees and further
lowering licensees' costs in assembling the patent rights essential to their compliance with the
MPEG-2 standard.
In different circumstances, the right of partial termination set forth in Section 6.3 of the
Portfolio license could raise difficult competition issues. That section provides that, on instruction
from any Licensor, MPEG LA … shall withdraw from a particular licensee's portfolio license that
Licensor's patent or patents if the licensee has sued the Licensor for infringement of an Essential
Patent or a Related Patent and refused to grant a license on the allegedly infringed patent on "fair
and reasonable terms."
The partial termination right may enable Licensors to obtain licenses on Related Patents at
royalty levels below what they would have been in a competitive market. Consequently, the partial
termination right may dampen licensees' incentives to invest in research and development of
MPEG-2 implementations, undercutting somewhat the benefits of the openness of the MPEG-2
standard and the prospects for improvements on the Essential Patents.
This impact on the incentive to innovate within the MPEG-2 standard would be of particular
concern were the partial termination right designed to benefit all portfolio licensees. In that event,
the partial termination right would function much like a compulsory grantback into the Portfolio.
Licensees that owned Related Patents would not be able to choose among and negotiate freely with
potential users of their inventions. The licensees' potential return from their R&D investments
could be curtailed drastically, and the corresponding impact on their incentive to innovate could
be significant.
Here, however, the partial termination right, unlike the grantback, protects only the Licensors.
Other portfolio licensees have no right under the pool license to practice fellow licensees'
inventions. And the Licensors are likely to be restrained in exercising their partial termination
rights because the development of Related Patents will enhance MPEG-2 and, thus, the value of
the Portfolio. The long-term interest of the Licensors is generally to encourage innovation in
Related Patents, not to stifle it.
Moreover, the partial termination right may have procompetitive effects to the extent that it
functions as a nonexclusive grantback requirement on licensees' Related Patents. It could allow
Licensors and licensees to share the risk and rewards of supporting and improving the MPEG-2
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standard by enabling Licensors to capture some of the value they have added to licensees' Related
Patents by creating and licensing the Portfolio.) In effect, the partial termination right may enable
Licensors to realize greater returns on the Portfolio license from the licensees that enjoy greater
benefits from the license, while maintaining the Portfolio royalty at a level low enough to attract
licensees that may value it less. This in turn could lead to more efficient exploitation of the
Portfolio technology.
Therefore, in light of both its potentially significant procompetitive effects and the limited
potential harm it poses to Portfolio licensees' incentives to innovate, the partial-termination clause
appears on balance unlikely to be anticompetitive.
III. Conclusion
Like many joint licensing arrangements, the agreements you have described for the licensing
of MPEG-2 Essential Patents are likely to provide significant cost savings to Licensors and
licensees alike, substantially reducing the time and expense that would otherwise be required to
disseminate the rights to each MPEG-2 Essential Patent to each would-be licensee. Moreover, the
proposed agreements that will govern the licensing arrangement have features designed to enhance
the usual procompetitive effects and mitigate potential anticompetitive dangers. The limitation of
the Portfolio to technically essential patents and the use of an independent expert to be the arbiter
of that limitation reduces the risk that the patent pool will be used to eliminate rivalry between
potentially competing technologies. Potential licensees will be aided by the provision of a clear
list of the Portfolio patents, the availability of the Portfolio patents independent of the Portfolio,
and the warning that the Portfolio may not contain all Essential Patents. The conditioning of
licensee royalty liability on actual use of the Portfolio patents, the clearly stated freedom of
licensees to develop and use alternative technologies, and the imposition of obligations on
licensees' own patent rights that do not vitiate licensees' incentives to innovate, all serve to protect
competition in the development and use of both improvements on, and alternatives to, MPEG-2
technology.
For these reasons, the Department is not presently inclined to initiate antitrust enforcement
action against the conduct you have described. This letter, however, expresses the Department's
current enforcement intention. In accordance with our normal practices, the Department reserves
the right to bring an enforcement action in the future if the actual operation of the proposed conduct
proves to be anticompetitive in purpose or effect.
Sincerely,
Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General
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Key Design Features for Standards Patent Pools
The DOJ’s MPEG-2 letter formalized a list of features that has come to be viewed as an industry
best practice for the design of patent pools. While, strictly speaking, these features are not legally
required, they appear to have influenced the DOJ’s favorable evaluation of the MPEG-2 pool and
several other pools that it has evaluated since. These features include:
1.

Transparency – the pool’s royalty rates and terms are publicly disclosed

2.

Nondiscrimination – the pool offers the same rates and terms to all similarly situated
licensees, and will grant a license to any applicant that accepts those terms

3.

Independence – pool members are permitted to license their patents independently of the
pool

4.

Voluntariness – pool members and licensees are not required to use the standard(s) covered
by the pool in their products

5.

Essentiality – the pool will assess each pooled patent for essentiality to the standard

6.

Complementarity – the pool will not cover technologies that compete with or can be
viewed as substitutes for one another

NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. MPEG Grew. When the DOJ issued its business review letter on the MPEG-2 pool, the
pool contained 27 patents. At its peak in the early 2010s, the MPEG-2 pool contained over 1,000
patents.21 Do you think that the guidelines outlined by the DOJ in its business review letter apply
equally to a pool of 27 versus 1,000+ patents? Why or why not?
2. Fair and Reasonable Royalties. Recall the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Standard Oil
(Indiana) that “Unless the industry is dominated, or interstate commerce directly restrained, the
Sherman Act does not require cross-licensing patentees to license at reasonable rates others
engaged in interstate commerce.” How does this holding square with the FRAND obligations that
are often imposed by SDOs on participants in standards development? When a pool is formed
around patents that are essential to a particular standard that is subject to a FRAND commitment,
should that commitment bind the pool?
3. Nondiscrimination. The DOJ notes that the MPEG-2 pool will license its patents on a
“nondiscriminatory” basis and “explicitly requires MPEG LA to offer the Portfolio license on the
same terms and conditions to all would-be licensees.” Why is this requirement important from a
competition standpoint? How does the pool’s "most-favored-nation" clause further prevent any
attempt to discriminate on royalty rates? The most-favored and nondiscrimination provisions of
the pool agreement ensure that all licensees are treated in a consistent manner, but what if everyone
is treated equally unfairly?

21

The last of the MPEG-2 pooled patents is believed to have expired in 2018.

27
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3716569

Contreras

IP Licensing and Transactions

Chapter 27

Nondiscriminatory licensing does not mean, of course, that every licensee must pay exactly
the same amount to a pool. Many patent royalties are based on a percentage of the licensee’s
revenue, meaning that licensees who sell more licensed products pay more. Some pools charge
different rates based on the type of product that the licensee produces. For example, in 2016, for
a DVD video player, the DVD6C pool charged the greater of (i) 4% of the net selling price (up to
a maximum of US$8.00 per player) or (ii) US$4.00 per player; while for a DVD disc, the pool
charged $0.05 per disc.22 Do you see any competitive risks in a patent pool charging different rates
based on the types of products to be manufactured? What about differences based on the size or
sales volume of the licensee?
DVD players and DVD discs are fundamentally different products, even if they are intended
to work together. Maybe this difference justifies differential pricing of pooled patents. But can
differential pricing be justified when the same product (e.g., a wireless communications chip) is
sold for use in different applications (e.g., an electric meter versus a smartphone versus an
automobile versus a passenger airplane)? On one hand, a chip is a chip is a chip. But on the other
hand, the value that such a chip brings to different applications may differ appreciably. Is it
nondiscriminatory to charge users of a patented article different prices based on the value of the
larger product in which they will incorporate the article?
4. Independent Licensing. The DOJ notes that in the MPEG-2 pool, “each Portfolio patent is
also available for licensing independently from the MPEG-2 Licensor that … licensed it to MPEG
LA.” The DOJ has consistently emphasized the pro-competitive benefits of allowing pool
members to license their patents independently of the pool. It explained in 2013,
Having the option to license independently of a pool can mitigate the effects of
potential market power. For example, independent licensing can encourage
competition and create incentives for innovators to invent around some of the
patents in a pool. Efficiencies from licensing outside of a pool are more likely when
the transaction costs of negotiating with multiple licensors are not prohibitive.23
As noted by Layne-Farrar and Lerner, “most modern pool agreements allow for independent
licensing by pool members outside of the pool”.24 Nevertheless, not all pools have followed this
pattern. In 1998, the FTC issued a complaint against two suppliers of patented photorefractive
keratectomy (PRK) (eye surgery) equipment. In 1992, the suppliers, VISX, Inc. and Summit
Technology, Inc., formed a partnership called Pillar Point Partners (PPP) in which they pooled
their PRK patents. The agreement provided that PPP would have the exclusive right to license the
parties’ respective PRK patents to third parties, and that either party could veto the decision to
grant such a license. Between 1992 and 1998, PPP granted no licenses to third parties. The FTC
alleged that the pooling arrangement had the effect of eliminating competition between VISX and

22

DVD6C Licensing Group, Royalty Rates under
http://www.dvd6cla.com/royaltyrate.html (visited Sep. 16, 2020).

DVD6C

Licensing

23

Program,

Letter from William J. Baer, Assistant Attorney General to Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell,
LLP, dated Mar. 26, 2013 [IPXI Letter].

24

Layne-Farrer & Lerner, supra note 10, at 296.
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Summit in the market for PRK technology licensing. In settling the FTC’s claims, the parties
agreed to dissolve PPP and not to interfere with one another’s licensing of their PRK technology.25

Two manufacturers of PRK equipment for laser eye surgery pooled their patents in an arrangement
challenged by the FTC [photo: U.S. Air Force]

5. Voluntary Adoption. In its MPEG-2 letter, the DOJ notes that the pool “explicitly leaves
licensees free independently to make products that do not comply with the MPEG-2 standard.” In
other words, licensees are free to make products that comply with MPEG-2 standards or not, and
are also free to adopt and use standards that compete with MPEG-2. Why is this freedom
important?
6. Grantback. The MPEG-2 pool requires licensees to grant any of the pool licensors a
nonexclusive worldwide license to any Essential Patent that it has the right to license on fair and
reasonable terms. In their 2017 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP, the DOJ and FTC
analyze grantback clauses as follows:
The Agencies will evaluate a grantback provision under the rule of reason,
considering its likely effects in light of the overall structure of the licensing
arrangement and conditions in the relevant markets. An important factor in the
Agencies’ analysis of a grantback will be whether the licensor has market power in
a relevant technology or research and development market. If the Agencies
determine that a particular grantback provision is likely to reduce significantly
licensees’ incentives to invest in improving the licensed technology, the Agencies
will consider the extent to which the grantback provision has offsetting
procompetitive effects, such as (1) promoting dissemination of licensees’
improvements to the licensed technology, (2) increasing the licensors’ incentives
to disseminate the licensed technology, or (3) otherwise increasing competition and
output in a relevant technology or research and development market. In addition,

25

In re. Summit Tech. Inc. and VISX, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9286, Complaint (filed Mar. 24, 1998).
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the Agencies will consider the extent to which grantback provisions in the relevant
markets generally increase licensors’ incentives to innovate in the first place.26
How would these considerations affect the agencies’ evaluation of the MPEG-2 pool? Do you
think that the pool had market power in 1997? What about in 2013? How important is it that the
pool permits licensees to charge a reasonable royalty for their Essential Patents, rather than
requiring grantback licenses to be free of charge? Why does the DOJ conclude that “the grantback
should not create any disincentive among licensees to innovate”?
7. Defensive Termination. Another feature of the MPEG-2 license agreement is a “partial
termination” right, which enables a pool member to cause the pool to terminate a licensee’s license
under any of the member’s patents if that licensee has sued the licensor for infringement of an
essential patent and has refused to grant the pool member a license on fair and reasonable terms.
In effect, the partial termination right is a backstop to the licensee’s grantback obligation. If it fails
to grant a FRAND license to a pool member, that member may withdraw those patents that the
pool has licensed to the intransigent licensee. For this reason, clauses of this nature are often
referred to as “defensive” termination clauses. Why do you think that a defensive termination
clause is needed in addition to the grantback clause discussed above? Would a defensive
termination clause be sufficient without the grantback?
In assessing the MPEG-2 pool, the DOJ reasons that “[i]n different circumstances, the right of
partial termination … could raise difficult competition issues”. In particular, the DOJ expresses
concern that “[t]he partial termination right may enable Licensors to obtain licenses on Related
Patents at royalty levels below what they would have been in a competitive market. Consequently,
the partial termination right may dampen licensees' incentives to invest in research and
development of MPEG-2 implementations”. Why are these concerns alleviated under the licensing
framework proposed by the MPEG-2 pool? Would the number of market participants in the pool
matter to this analysis?
8. Essentiality. One of the key features of the MPEG-2 pool, and most patent pools today, is
that the “The Portfolio combines patents that an independent expert has determined to be essential
to compliance with the MPEG-2 standard.” In effect, only “essential” patents may be included in
the pool. Why is it important that non-essential patents be excluded from the pool? Why is an
independent expert evaluation desirable?
Of course, independent patent evaluation does not come cheap. Professors Robert Merges and
Michael Mattioli determined that the organizer of the MPEG Audio pool (unrelated to the MPEG2 pool) paid attorney fees of approximately $7,500 per patent evaluated for essentiality. With
around 700 patents, this resulted in a price tag of approximately $5,250,000.27 Is this cost worth

26

U.S. Dept. Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines For The Licensing of Intellectual
Property, § 5.6, 33-34 (2017).

27

Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Patent Pools, 78 Ohio St.
L.J. 281, 306 (2017). See also Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-Essential Patents in
Cambridge Handbook Of Technical Standardization Law: Competition, Antitrust, and Patents 209, 215-16
(Jorge L. Contreras, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press: 2017) (discussing costs and benefits of validating
essentiality).
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it? Is there a less expensive way to determine essentiality of patents covering complex technology
standards?
Compare the approach taken by standards development organizations (SDOs) as described in
Chapter 20.A (Notes 1 and 3). SDOs permit their participants to self-declare which patents are
essential to their standards. There is no cost to the SDO, but there is also no verification whether
those patents are essential or not. Independent studies have estimated that so-called overdeclaration is rampant at SDOs, as patent holders have little incentive not to declare any particular
patent as essential to a standard.28 Which approach to patent essentiality do you think is better:
that of patent pools, which spend large sums independently evaluating each patent, or of SDOs,
which spend nothing, but get a less accurate view of whether or not patents are essential to their
standards?
9. Complementarity. Closely related to the issue of essentiality is that of complementarity.
From an antitrust perspective, patents included in a pool should be essential to practice one
particular standard, not a variety of different standards that could act as substitutes for one another.
In other words, patents within a pool should be complementary, but not substitutes. The theory
behind this important requirement is the subject of Part D, below.
10. Beyond Standards. While many of the recent DOJ business review letters concerning
patent pools have revolved around technical standards, pools continue to be formed and planned
around other technologies with fragmented IP ownership. Returning to the world of biotechnology,
one of these areas is CRISPR gene editing technology. Foundational patents relating to CRISPR
are held by the University of California and the Broad Institute (a joint venture of Harvard and
MIT), as well as several foreign universities. In 2017, MPEG LG, the creator of the MPEG-2
patent pool, proposed a pool relating to CRISPR patents. So far, the Broad Institute has indicated
its interest in joining.
[J]ust as MPEG LA’s pioneering pool license model helped assure the success of
digital video in the consumer electronics industry with convenient one-stop access
to relevant intellectual property, now CRISPR can benefit from MPEG LA’s patent
pool approach with an impact far more profound.
MPEG LA’s CRISPR Cas-9 Joint Licensing Platform will give technology owners
the opportunity to share in mass-market royalties from their CRISPR technology
while enjoying, with other developers, broad access to other important CRISPR
technologies. As a voluntary market-based business solution to the patent access
problem tailored to balance, incentivize and resolve competing market and public
interests, an independently managed patent pool is the best hope for unleashing
CRISPR’s full potential for the benefit of humanity.29
Some commentators have questioned the viability of a CRISPR patent pool as proposed by
MPEG LA:
We believe that the lack of commercial patent pooling and FRAND licensing in the
biopharma sector is due to the high cost of product development, clinical trials, and
regulatory approval required to market new drugs and treatments. In many cases,
28

See Contreras, Essentiality, supra note 27, at 222-25.
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MPEG LA, CRISPR, https://www.mpegla.com/crispr/initiative/ (visited Sep. 16, 2020).
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private-sector firms that incur these costs will be profitable (and viable) only if they
can leverage the market exclusivity afforded by patent rights for a limited period.
Indeed, this is an animating concern behind much of the lengthy and costly
development of cancer therapeutics today. Because patent pools do not lend
themselves to exclusive licensing, even when commercially desirable in narrow
fields, we question whether patent pooling for CRISPR would ultimately be
successful.30
Which view do you find to be more persuasive?

Can patent pools promote the broad accessibility of CRISPR gene editing technology?
[image: Natl. Inst. Health]

D.

COMPLEMENTARITY AND ESSENTIALITY IN PATENT POOLS

As noted in the Department of Justice’s MPEG-2 Letter, the limitation of the MPEG-2 pool to
patents essential to the MPEG-2 standard, and excluding patents that covered substitute
technologies, was an important factor in finding that the pool would not result in anticompetitive
effects. This rationale has been adopted in every subsequent pool that has been reviewed by the
DOJ,31 and was taken to its most extreme point in the Third Generation Patent Platform Partnership
(3GPP) pooling structure, which involved five different and competing standards for third
generation wireless communications.

30

Jorge L. Contreras and Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent pools for CRISPR technology – Response, 355 Science
1274 (2017).

31

European competition law authorities take an even stronger view of this principle, stating that “The
creation of a technology pool ... composed solely or predominantly of substitute technologies amounts to a
price fixing cartel”. Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the functioning of the
European Union to technology transfer agreements (2014/C 89/03) of Mar. 28, 2014, ¶ 245.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION
3GPP BUSINESS REVIEW LETTER
November 12, 2002
Ky P. Ewing, Esq.
Vinson & Elkins L.L.P.
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1008
Dear Mr. Ewing:
This letter responds to your request on behalf of the 3G Patent Platform Partnership
("Partnership") for the issuance of a business review letter pursuant to the Department of Justice
Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6.
I. The IMT-2000 Family of 3G Standards
There are two generations of wireless communications systems in use today in the United
States and other nations. The first uses analog transmission technology, while the second
generation ("2G") uses various digital transmission technologies and makes possible the provision
of some additional services along with voice telephony. The third generation ("3G") of wireless
communication systems, also involving the use of digital transmission technologies, will enable
not only wireless voice telephony, but also the transmission of data at rates much higher than those
of the second generation systems, making additional applications possible.
As with the second generation, there will not be a single global 3G radio interface technology.
Pursuant to its International Mobile Telephony-2000 ("IMT-2000") project, the International
Telecommunication Union ("ITU") has approved five different radio interface technologies for use
in 3G systems, which determine how a signal travels over the air from a user's handset to an
operator's terrestrial network:
• IMT-Multicarrier ("IMT-MC"), also known as CDMA-2000
• IMT-Direct Spread ("IMT-DS"), also known as Wideband-CDMA ("W-CDMA")
• IMT-Time Code ("IMT-TC"), also known as TD-CDMA4
• IMT-Single Carrier ("IMT-SC"), also known as UWC-136 or TDMA-EDGE
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• IMT-Frequency Time ("IMT-FT"), also known as Digital Enhanced Cordless
Telecommunications ("DECT")
Each 3G radio interface technology has evolved from one or more of the 2G technologies. WCDMA, for example, is a descendant of the Global Standard for Mobile Communications
("GSM"), the 2G technology mandated throughout Europe and used in some other areas in the
world as well. CDMA-2000, in contrast, has evolved out of IS-955 Code Division Multiple Access
("CDMA"), one of the two most widely used 2G technologies in the U.S., while TDMAEDGE
builds on IS-136 Time Division Multiple Access ("TDMA"), the other most widely used 2G
technology in the U.S. By design, each 3G technology will afford a degree of backwards
compatibility with networks employing the 2G technology from which it evolved. While an
operator's choice of 2G technology is likely to be a significant factor in its choice of 3G technology,
it does not appear to be determinative. Several substantial wireless operators in various countries,
including the United States, have indicated that they are considering a 3G radio interface
technology other than the one evolving most directly from the technology in the operator's 2G
installed base. Moreover, since many nations are awarding more licenses for 3G service than they
had for 2G or are making additional spectrum available that could be acquired by other operators,
there will likely be new entrants into 3G service unconstrained by installed base considerations.8
The alternatives available to an operator for its 3G radio interface standard could constrain prices
or other terms offered by the owners of 3G patents, to the extent that individual patents are not
essential for all five standards.
As with most standardized technology, utilization of any of the interface standards may
implicate the patent rights of numerous entities. As of June 2000, a total of 45 firms had claimed
ownership of at least one patent essential to compliance with one or more of the 3G radio interface
standards to at least one standards-related body. Consequently, it appears likely that any operator
of a 3G wireless system and any manufacturer of 3G equipment, whether handsets or network
infrastructure, regardless of the particular radio interface technology it adopts, will need to acquire
licenses from multiple patent holders, and for some standards may need licenses for a large number
of patents. Each such patent owner could exclude an operator or manufacturer from the use of a
3G technology by denying it a license.
II. The Proposed 3G Patent Platform Arrangement
The 3G Patent Platform serves several distinct functions, including identifying, evaluating and
certifying patents essential to compliance with one or more of the five distinct 3G standards in the
IMT-2000 "family," and providing a mechanism by which licensors and licensees can enter into a
Standard License Agreement for each 3G patent applicable to a technology... As the Platform
Specification makes clear, there will not actually be a single 3G Patent Platform entity, but rather
a number of entities created with distinct personnel and responsibilities to carry out the various
functions identified in the Platform Specification, and to ensure that where such functions may
implicate competitive considerations among the five technologies, competitive choices are made
independently for each technology rather than on a common basis.
The Platform will carry out licensing functions through five separate and independent Platform
Companies ("PlatformCos"), one for each of the five 3G radio interface technologies, with a
separate Licensing Administrator ("LA") and a separate board of directors for each PlatformCo.
The members of each PlatformCo will be the two subscribers initially chosen by the Partnership
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from firms likely to hold essential patents, and all licensors that thereafter submit patents for
evaluation and are certified as holding essential patents applicable to that 3G technology. Each
PlatformCo is to be managed by its board of directors, consisting of one representative of each
licensor member, which will be responsible for decisions on royalty rates and license terms, while
decisions on any changes to PlatformCo governing documents are made by PlatformCo members.
The licensing functions assigned to each PlatformCo are to be conducted by its LA, recognizing
the potentially competitively sensitive nature of these functions, but the LA generally does not act
as a licensor and the LA's responsibilities do not include the actual collection or distribution of
royalties for licensors.
The five PlatformCos can have a limited number of shared functions, coordinated through a
Management Company ("ManCo") with which the PlatformCos are initially expected to enter into
a service agreement, and a Common Administrator ("CA") and an Evaluation Service Provider
("ESP") to whom specific Manco responsibilities will be assigned or outsourced. The functions of
ManCo are defined as: (I) patent evaluation service outsourced to the ESP; (2) evaluation-related
services most likely outsourced to the CA; (3) education of third parties about the 3G Platform
concept; and (4) industry-wide market research and analysis, as opposed to research and analysis
for or regarding a specific company. The CA, whose responsibilities are focused on assisting the
evaluation process and providing general information about 3G, will initially be selected by the
Partnership but thereafter the five PlatformCos will be responsible collectively for appointing a
CA. The members of ManCo are not limited to licensors, unlike the PlatformCos, but can include
licensees and other interested parties in the industry. Manco will be managed by a board of
directors chosen by the members, and will also have non-voting representatives of each of the five
PlatformCos on its board committees.
Once a licensor or licensee participates in any of the evaluation or-licensing processes
established for a PlatformCo, it becomes subject to that PlatformCo's licensing obligations.
Licensors who submit any of their patents for evaluation are required to make all of their essential
patents related to that specific 3G technology available under the relevant PlatformCo's standard
licensing terms to licensees that want to avail themselves of those terms. In turn, licensees who
accept either a Standard License or an Interim License agreement from a licensor are required to
submit all of their 3G-related patents for evaluation of essentiality, and to make such patents
available under the platform terms if they are found to be essential. This "grant-back" obligation
extends to third parties who receive sublicenses or make products using licensed technology on
behalf of a licensee. However, this obligation is specific to the individual PlatformCos associated
with a 3G technology, "and shall not be across PlatformCos," so that submitting patents for
evaluation or accepting a Standard or Interim License with respect to one 3G technology does not
oblige a patent holder to submit its essential patents for review, to become a PlatformCo member,
or to accept the platform licensing terms with respect to any of the other four 3G technologies.
Patent holders and licensees can avoid the grant-back obligation entirely by negotiating bilateral
licenses outside the Platform without using an Interim License. Licensors may also leave their
PlatformCo on one year's notice, though they remain obligated to license essential patents under
the PlatformCo's licensing requirements during that year and existing licenses remain in place after
the resignation takes effect.
[Description of how the PlatformCos will evaluate essentiality of patents and license them to
third parties is omitted.]
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III. Analysis
It is reasonably likely that essential patents associated with a single 3G technology, as defined
in the Platform Specification, will be complements rather than substitutes. Essential patents by
definition have no substitutes; one needs licenses to each of them in order to comply with the
standard. The arrangements proposed in connection with the Platform, including (1) the limitation
of patents to those "technically" essential to compliance, (2) the provisions for review of
essentiality by competent experts without conflicts of interest and payment of the costs of
evaluation through fees assessed on applicants, (3) retention of the experts by the ESP rather than
directly by licensors, and (4) the financial incentives of licensors to object to the inclusion of others'
non-essential patents that could lower per-patent compensation under the royalty formula, provide
reasonable assurance that patents combined in a single PlatformCo for a 3G radio interface
technology will not be substitutes for one another. so In the future, patent holders for a specific 3G
technology are free to develop new mechanisms to reduce costs of identification and licensing of
essential patents which could further enhance competition, without affecting difference'.) between
technologies based on market forces.
There is however, publicly available evidence that several of the five 3G radio interface
technologies have been competing with each other for adoption by wireless system operators and
could continue to be the basis for competition among operators once 3G wireless services are on
the market. There is a reasonable possibility that the five 3G radio interface technologies will
continue to be substitutes for each other, and we would expect the owners of intellectual property
rights essential to these technologies to compete, including through price, to persuade operators to
adopt their technology. The actual Platform arrangements have been structured to take into account
substitutability between 3G technologies by creating an independent PlatformCo to handle all
licensing matters, including setting of actual royalty rates, with respect to each individual 3G
technology. Though the five PlatformCos will operate under a standard Platform Specification,
including a common methodology for calculating royalties due, and at least at the outset will make
use of standard license terms, each PlatformCo will have the ability to modify license terms over
time, and from the outset each PlatformCo will independently determine the key values used to
calculate royalties.

Cellular communication protocols have evolved to enable better, faster and higher bandwidth
connections and voice, data and video content transmission
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NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. And the Winner Is? Though the 3GPP pool included patents for five 3G standards, it soon
became apparent that only one of the five contenders would emerge as the victor. The W-CDMA
standard known as UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications Standard), based on the
European GSM 2G standard, was quickly adopted and rolled out in Europe and Japan. In South
Korea, both major telecommunications carriers adopted the Qualcomm-backed CDMA-2000
standard, as did Verizon Wireless in the United States. AT&T and T-Mobile (an offshoot of
Deutsche Telekom), however, opted for the European-style UMTS. U.S. carriers remained split
through the 2000s, causing incompatibility among their networks (i.e., an AT&T phone could not
connect to Verizon’s network). However, with the advent of the 4G LTE standard in 2010, all
major carriers around the world have moved to a single compatible standard. Are there any
benefits to having a diversity of communications standards, or is the world better off with a single
standard?
2. Five Standards, Five Pools. As described in the DOJ’s 3GPP letter, each 3G standard had
its own patent pool with separate administration and licensing. This structure was necessary to
ensure that only patents essential to the individual 3GPP standards would be included in each pool,
and that the standards would be able to compete with one another. Was this degree of patent
segregation really necessary?
3. Non-essential Patents. Sometimes, parties to a patent pool may inadvertently include a
non-essential patent in the pool, or a standard may change so that a patent originally included in
the pool becomes non-essential. Is this a problem? The Federal Circuit considered the question
in Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com'n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). There, Philips and
Sony collaborated to create a standard for recordable and writable compact discs (CD-R/RW).
While the standard was under development, each of Philips and Sony (as well as other companies)
committed to pool their patents required to implement the standard. But by the time the final
standard was agreed, it no longer contained technology covered by one of Sony’s patents (referred
to as the Lagadec patent). Princo, a Taiwanese disc manufacturer, entered into a license for the
pooled patents, but then stopped paying royalties after it realized that the Lagadec patent was not
essential to practice the CD-R/RW standard. Princo argued that including the Lagadec patent in
the pool constituted anticompetitive conduct by Sony and Philips.32 The Federal Circuit rejected
Princo’s arguments, reasoning that Philips’s and Sony’s engineers determined that the Lagadec
technology was not a viable solution for recordable CDs. As a result, the Lagadec technology could
not compete with or substitute for the final CD-R/RW standard. Therefore, its inclusion in the pool
was not a violation of the antitrust laws. Do you agree? Why or why not?
4. Defensive Patent Aggregation. In response to perceived litigation threats from patent
assertion entities, a new breed of firm called a “defensive patent aggregator” has emerged. The
most prominent of these is RPX Corp. RPX claims that since its inception in 2008, it has acquired
more than 60,000 patents in industries including automotive, electronics, computers, e-commerce,
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financial services, software, media, communications, networking and semiconductors.33 RPX
charges its member companies an annual subscription fees based on their annual revenue, with
fees ranging from tens of thousands to millions of dollars. RPX grants each of its 300+ members
a license to practice all of RPX’s aggregated patent rights. These licenses last while a company is
a member of RPX, and become perpetual after a certain number of years. Members are not required
to grant RPX or other members any of their own patent rights. As such, RPX may be the largest
patent pool ever created, but it differs substantially from the pools discussed in this chapter in a
number of important respects:
•

RPX does not obtain patent rights from its members, but from third parties

•

RPX’s patents cover many different technologies that, in theory, might compete or act
as substitutes for one another, and are not evaluated for essentiality to any particular
standard

•

The fees paid by RPX members to the pool are not disclosed, and vary from member
to member

Given these differences, how relevant to patent aggregators like RPX are the DOJ’s and FTC’s
analyses of the pro-competitive effects of patent pools? Do you see any potential antitrust issues
in such patent aggregation structures? Given the close question in Princo, which involved just one
patent that was not essential to the CD-R/RW standard, does it matter that RPX members receive
licenses to thousands of patents covering technologies that could act as substitutes for one another?
What might the effect of such an arrangement be on innovation?
In 2012, RPX was sued by Cascades Computer Innovations LLC,34 a patent assertion entity
that sought to sell or license a portfolio of patents to RPX. When the deal failed to materialize,
Cascades alleged that RPX represented an illegal buyer’s cartel that depressed the price for the
patents that it sought to sell. The case was dismissed on other grounds prior to a hearing on the
merits of the antitrust claim. But what do you think of Cascades’s theory? Is it relevant that RPX
members can direct RPX to negotiate to acquire particular patent portfolios that they view as
threats?35
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